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UTAH SUPREME COURT 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
Luke Zachary Baker, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Brief of Petitioner 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) 
(West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
This Court granted the State's petition on the following two issues: 
1. "Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction or application of the 
Fourth Amendment as to the permissible length and scope of detention of 
passengers in a vehicle that police have stopped." See Order, dated 11 July 2008 (a 
copy is attached in addendum A). 
2. "Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction or application of the 
Fourth Amendment relating to the circumstances under which searches for weapons 
may be conducted/' Id. 
Standard of Review. On certiorari review, this Court reviews "the decision of 
the court of appeals, not the decision of the district court." Utah County v. Butler, 
2008 UT 12, 1 9, 179 P.3d 775 (quotation marks and citations omitted). "The 
correctness of the court of appeal's decision turns on whether that court correctly 
reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." Id. 
(quotation marks and citations omitted). The appellate court reviews for clear error 
the factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94,f11,100 P3d 1222. The trial court's legal 
conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including its application 
of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,112,103 P.3d 699. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
Charge. Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a 
drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(, (4) (West 2004), possession of paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-8(4), 58-37a-5 (West 2004). 
Rl. 
Motion to suppress. Defendant was one of four passengers detained incident 
to the traffic stop and subsequent arrest of the driver. After police officers recovered 
thirteen knives from the driver and passengers, including defendant, and a drug-
detection dog alerted on the vehicle, defendant and the other passengers were 
subjected to weapons frisks, which led to the discovery of a drug pipe on 
defendant's person. See R149:6-8. Subsequent searches of defendant's person 
revealed methamphetamine and additional paraphernalia. Id.; see also R150:28. 
Defendant moved to suppress the drug evidence. R41-36. 
Facts.1 In the early morning hours of 30 September 2004, Officer Robertson of 
the Pleasant Grove Police Department stopped a vehicle for "no plate light/' R149:5. 
1
 The facts are adduced from the preliminary hearing held on 24 November 
2004, see R149, and the suppression hearing held on 9 February 2005, see R150. They 
are recited in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling denying defendant's 
motion to suppress. State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229,1230 (Utah 1996). 
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As he approached the vehicle, Officer Robertson saw five occupants, including 
defendant, who was one of three backseat passengers. R150:25-26. The officer 
"used a flashlight to survey the back passengers before [he] approached the driver." 
Id. at 25. He saw a large sheathed knife "on one of the rear passengers." Id. at 26; see 
also R149:13 ("It was in plain view in a leather sheath, fairly large knife"). After 
talking with the driver and obtaining her license, Officer Robertson returned to his 
patrol car to run a computer check, which revealed that the driver's license was 
"[s]uspended for drugs." R149:5; R150:25; see also R149:ll. Simultaneously with 
learning that the driver's license was suspended, Officer Robertson requested a K~9 
unit, at approximately 1:21 a.m. R149:ll, 18. 
While waiting for the K-9 unit to arrive, Officer Robertson initiated an arrest 
of the driver, and alerted a backup officer, Officer Bartell, that "there were knives in 
plain view." R149:14; see also id. at 6, and R150:26. While Officer Robertson 
continued with the arrest of the driver, Officer Bartell asked the vehicle occupants 
about weapons. R150:9. 
One of the rear seat passengers told Officer Bartell that he had a knife. R150:9. 
Officer Bartell said, "[W]ell, I better take the knife until we finish[] up with the 
stop," and also asked "if there were anymore [sic] knives in the vehicle." Id. In 
response, "[e]veryone started handing [him] knives— [E]verybody at least handed 
4 
[him] one knife/' R150:9-10; see also id. at 11-12. Some were large pocketknives, with 
approximately five to six inch blades. R150:12, 21. There was also a set of small 
throwing knives that were about three to four indies long. R150:12. Approximately 
thirteen knives were recovered from the driver and passengers and set out on the 
hood of a patrol car. R149:13, 21; see also R150:16, 27. According to Officer 
Robertson, it was "rare" to find a knife during a traffic stop, let alone thirteen 
knives. R150:32. 
At approximately 1:33 a.m. the driver was placed in the patrol car, and at 1:34 
a.m., or approximately thirteen minutes after it was requested, the K-9 unit arrived. 
R149:17-18. The K-9 unit included Officer Lopez and his police service dog. R150:5. 
Officer Lopez "made a safety check of the exterior of the vehicle," and then 
"deploy[ed his] police service dog." Id. at 6. The dog alerted twice on the vehicle: 
once "on the trunk of the vehicle on the driver's side," and once "on the driver's 
handle—the driver's rear passenger handle of the vehicle, the rear door." Id.) see also 
id. at 7. 
After the dog alerted, another backup officer, Officer Rockwood, removed the 
passengers from the vehicle and frisked them. R150:15-16. In the course of frisking 
defendant, Officer Rockwood "found a bulge in his front [pants] pocket," and 
"asked [defendant] if [he] could retrieve it," and "what it was." Id. at 17. After 
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defendant responded that the object was a pipe, Officer Rockwood "retrieved it out 
of his pocket." Id. at 18. Officer Rockwood observed that the pipe had been used 
for marijuana. Id. A further frisk of defendant's shoe yielded a second pipe. Id. 
Defendant was arrested and taken to the police station where Officer Robertson 
recovered a small baggy containing seventy-one grams of methamphetamine from 
defendant's person. R149:7-8. 
Ruling. Based on this evidence, the trial court entered a written ruling 
denying defendant's motion to suppress the paraphernalia and methamphetamine 
seized from his person.2 The trial court began by recognizing that police officers 
may reasonably require passengers to remain inside a vehicle during a traffic stop, 
and that "a canine sniff conducted during a [] lawful traffic s top. . . does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment." R73-72 (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) and 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)). 
The trial court also entered the following factual findings: 
• "[T]he... traffic s top. . . was initiated very early in the morning 
on September 30,2004[.]" R72. 
• "[T]he K-9 was requested at 1:21 a.m.," "the K-9 arrived at 1:34 
a.m.," and "[defendant was searched and arrested at 1:45 a.m." 
Id. 
2
 A copy of the trial court's ruling is attached in addendum B. 
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• "The request for the K-9 coincided with the discovery that the 
driver's license had been suspended for drugs." Id. 
• "Defendant does not make any attenuation challenge to the 
actual time length of the stop or in connection with the K-9 
request[.]" Id. 
• "The K-9 arrived soon after the driver was placed under arrest in 
the police car[.] Id. 
• "[I]t was dark, extremely early in the morning, there were five 
occupants, two knives had already been found, and the officers 
were dealing with the driver and her arrest until the K-9 
arrived." Id. 
• "[T]he officers never told the Defendant that he was not free to 
leave, although [the officer] testified that he subjectively believed 
that (which is irrelevant)." Id. 
Although the trial court recognized that detaining passengers was reasonable 
under Wilson, based on the above findings, the trial court ultimately concluded that 
no detention occurred here because police "never told [defendant that he was not 
free to leave." R72 (concluding defendant "was not 'detained' for purposes of 
Fourth Amendment protections to be triggered").3 
The trial court also entered findings regarding the frisk of defendant's person, 
finding that "the K-9 unit, which responded to the scene 13 minutes after it was 
3
 The trial court's finding that defendant was not seized incident to the traffic 
stop predates the United States Supreme Court's decision in Brendlin v. California, 
127 S.Ct 2400,2403 (2007), where that Court clarified "that a passenger is seized" 
incident to a traffic stop of the driver. 
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called, alerted to the exterior of the vehicle that the Defendant was traveling in/ ' 
R72; see also id. ("Defendant has failed to challenge the canine's accuracy record"). 
From this finding, the trial court concluded that defendant was "properly searched 
incident to the probable cause derived from the positive canine alert." R71. 
Finally, the trial court made findings regarding an alternative, weapons-frisk 
justification for the search of defendant's person: 
• "When the police [officers] initially approached the vehicle, they 
noted that one of the occupants in the back seat was armed with 
a large knife." R70-69. 
• "[W]hen the driver was searched incident to arrest for driving 
on a suspended license, another knife was found on her." R69. 
• "After the officers requested that the passengers turn over any 
other knives they had on them, a total of 13 knives were 
recovered, including at least one from the Defendant." Id. 
• "Officer Mike Bartell, who retrieved the knives,.. . recovered 
about 12 knives from the passengers, including a set of throwing 
knives." R70. 
• "Officer Chris Lavar Rockwood, who arrived to assist Officer 
Raymond Robertson, conducted the Terry frisk of . . . 
[defendant." Id. 
• "Before conducting the frisk, Officer Rockwood had observed 
'quite a few,' 'more than five' knives that had been taken from 
the vehicle and that they 'ranged [in size] from pocket knives to 
large knives.' He also admitted that while there had been no 
overt threats from the passengers, he still had a concern for 
officer safety after observing the large number of knives." Id. 
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• "Officer Robertson testified that it was a rare case to retrieve 12-
13 knives from a vehicle/' Id. 
• "Officer Robertson... is always concerned about officer safety, 
though he personally had no fear at this scene for his own 
safety." Id. 
• "[T]he Court emphasizes that it was dark, around 1:30 a.m., and 
there were a total of five occupants in the vehicle." Id. 
• "In sum, the Terry frisk of . . . [djefendant did not occur until 
after: 
a. The driver had been placed under arrest, 
b. 12-13 knives had been retrieved from the 
passengers and driver, including some large knives, 
c. A police-trained drug-detection canine alerted to 
the trunk and the rear door of the vehicle. The 
Court also notes that . . . [djefendant was a 
passenger in the rear seat at the time." Id. 
Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that "[t]he sheer number of 
knives alerted the officers that it was reasonable to conclude that there might be 
other weapons." Id. Accordingly, "it could not be much more clear that the officers 
reasonably believed that . . . [djefendant and the other passengers were armed and 
dangerous." Id. "[Thus], the officers conducted a proper Terry frisk of . . . 
[djefendant." R69. 
Conditional guilty plea. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to both 
charges, preserving his right to appeal the adverse ruling. R112-105,116-113. 
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Sentence. The trial court imposed an indeterminate term of one to fifteen 
years for the second degree felony, and a one-year jail term for the class B 
misdemeanor. R120. The court then suspended both terms and imposed a thirty-
six-month probation term, including a ninety-day jail term. R119. 
Timely appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R124. 
The court of appeals' opinion. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's 
order denying the motion to suppress. See State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 115, % 19,182 
P.3d 935 (a copy is attached in addendum C). The court of appeals recognized that 
police officers may "temporarily detain a vehicle and its occupants" incident to a 
traffic stop. Ti 10-11 (citing Brendlin v. California, 127 S.Ct. 2400 (2007) and State v. 
James, 2000 UT 80,110,13 P.3d 576). But here, once the driver was arrested for 
driving on suspension, the court of appeals held there was no longer any "lawful 
reason why the passengers were detained." Id. at % 12. According to the court of 
appeals, "the officers needed some reasonable articulable suspicion to lawfully 
detain [defendant] and the other passengers." Id. at 113. Because the officers did 
not suspect criminal activity on the part of the passengers, the court of appeals 
reasoned that "continued detention was impermissible." Id. The court of appeals 
thus held that "[defendant] was unlawfully detained from the moment the driver 
was placed under arrest." Id. at 119. The court of appeals did not address the 
10 
State's argument that passengers are reasonably detained until all the lawful 
objectives of a traffic stop are completed, including the arrest of the driver and 
incident search of the vehicle. See Aple. Br. at 12-16,18-19 (discussing Wilson and 
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)). 
A majority of the court of appeals further held that the weapons frisk of 
defendant's person was not justified by a reasonable suspicion that he or any of the 
other passengers may be armed and dangerous. Baker, 2008 UT App 115, f l 14-18; 
see also id. at f 20 (Thorne, J., concurring) (agreeing that Baker was unlawfully 
frisked, but clarifying that frisk was "illegal solely because the length and scope of 
Baker's detention prior to the frisk was unreasonable under the circumstances"). 
The majority acknowledged that the trial court's ruling upholding the weapons frisk 
was based on its findings that "it was dark, it was late at night, the driver had been 
arrested, there were four passengers who had been in possession of approximately 
thirteen knives, and a K~9 unit had detected controlled substances where the three 
passengers (including [defendant]) sat." Id. at f 14. "Looking at the totality of the 
circumstances!;]" however, the majority held that "nothing other than the knives gave 
police officers any reason to take precautionary steps." Id. at f18 (emphasis added). 
The majority reasoned that the thirteen knives did not give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that the passengers may be armed and dangerous because, when asked, 
11 
the passengers "volunteered" the knives to the officers. Id. The majority also 
deemed it significant that the weapons frisks of the passengers were "not conducted 
until well after the officers collected the knives and only after the K-9 unit indicated 
the presence of drugs in the backseat of the vehicle." Id. (emphasis in original). 
Thus, the majority surmised that "the mere presence of the already-confiscated 
knives did not tip the scales in favor of an objectively reasonable concern for officer 
safety." W.a t l l 9 . 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1(A). For reasons of officer safety, police officers may detain passengers 
incident to a traffic stop of the driver until all the lawful objectives of the stop are 
completed. If a vehicle occupant is arrested, the lawful objectives of the stop 
evolve, as a matter of law, to include safely searching the passenger 
compartment. 
Here, defendant was one of four passengers detained incident to a traffic 
stop of the driver, who was subsequently arrested for driving on a license 
4
 As noted above, the trial court found the frisk of defendant's person was 
justified on two alternative grounds: (1) probable cause that defendant, a backseat 
passenger, possessed drugs once the drug-detection dog alerted to the handle of the 
rear, driver's side door, see R72-71; and (2) reasonable suspicion that defendant may 
possess a weapon given the thirteen knives retrieved from the vehicle occupants, see 
R71-69. The court of appeals addressed only the latter ruling. 
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suspended for drugs. Defendant was therefore lawfully detained until the 
passenger compartment could be safely searched. Because defendant was 
frisked before the officers could safely search the passenger compartment, 
defendant continued to be lawfully detained when the weapons frisk occurred. 
The court of appeals did not acknowledge the State's argument. Rather, 
that court held that the passengers could not be detained absent individual 
reasonable suspicion once the driver was arrested and placed in the patrol 
vehicle. 
The United States Supreme Court has not expressly addressed the question 
of whether officers may detain passengers while they search the passenger 
compartment as a consequence of the driver's, or any other occupant's, arrest. 
But that Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, with its emphasis on officer 
safety, makes clear that the risk of harm to both the police officers and the vehicle 
occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command 
during a traffic stop. 
The court of appeals' holding is inconsistent with the weighty officer 
safety concerns recognized in the United States Supreme Court's most recent 
precedent and should therefore be overturned. 
13 
1(B), In any event, defendant's extended detention here was supported by-
reasonable suspicion that he may be armed and dangerous. Officer Robertson 
saw a knife on one of the back seat passengers when he first approached the 
vehicle. Ultimately, thirteen knives were retrieved from the vehicle occupants. 
Additionally, the driver was arrested for driving on suspension for drugs, a 
drug-dog alerted on the vehicle, the five vehicle occupants outnumbered the 
three to four officers variously at the scene, the hour was late, and the area was 
dark. These circumstances would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the 
belief that the extended detention was appropriate. 
II. Finally, the reasonable suspicion that justified defendant's extended 
detention during the traffic stop, also justified the weapons frisk of his person. A 
majority of the court of appeals held, however, that "nothing other than the 
knives gave police officers any reason to take precautionary steps," and that 
because the knives had been confiscated when defendant was frisked, the frisk 
was unjustified. On the contrary, if the retrieval of thirteen knives under these 
circumstances does not give rise to objective reasonable suspicion that the vehicle 
occupants may be armed and dangerous, it is difficult to imagine any 
circumstances that would. Contrary to the court of appeals' holding, the 
retrieval of the thirteen knives is just the kind of obvious articulable fact that 
14 
makes the determination of reasonable suspicion easier. The majority's unsound 
opinion should therefore be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION 
AND APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS TO 
THE PERMISSIBLE LENGTH AND SCOPE OF DETENTION OF 
PASSENGERS IN A LAWFULLY STOPPED VEHICLE. 
There is no dispute here that the initial seizure of defendant, a passenger in a 
vehicle stopped for a traffic violation, was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment California v. Brendlin, 127 S.Ct. 2400,2407 (2007) (recognizing "[i]t is 
reasonable for passengers to expect that a police officer at the scene of a crime, 
arrest, or investigation will not let people move around in ways that could 
jeopardize his safety"). The question on certiorari is how long a passenger seized 
incident to a traffic stop may reasonably be detained. 
The United States Supreme Court has yet to specifically address this issue. 
See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,415 n.3 (1997). In Wilson, the Supreme Court 
held that officers "may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of 
the stop," but declined to "go further and hold that an officer may forcibly detain a 
passenger for the entire duration of the stop," because that issue was "not presented 
by [the] case." Id. But the Supreme Court's clear concern for officer safety, 
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expressed most recently in Brendlin, supports the view that passengers are 
reasonably detained until all the lawful objectives of the traffic stop are completed. 
Indeed, Brendlin—together with the Supreme Court's prior opinions—"reflects a 
societal expectation of 'unquestioned [police officer] command'" during a traffic 
stop. Id. at 2407 (discussing Wilson, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), and 
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981)) (brackets in original). Notwithstanding 
the above, the court of appeals held that "from the moment the driver was placed 
under arrest," there was "no lawful reason why the passengers were detained." Id. 
at \ 12; see also id. at \ \ 10-11 (citing Brendlin and State v. James, 2000 UT 80,f10,13 
P.3d576). 
A "detention [incident to a traffic stop] 'must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop/" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 
1127,1132 (Utah 1994) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,500 (1983) and Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20) (1968)). And the length and scope of the stop must be 
"strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation 
permissible." Id. (case citation and quotation marks omitted). But where, as here, the 
driver is arrested, the lawful purposes of the stop evolve—as a matter of law—to 
include safely searching the passenger compartment of the vehicle. See New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); accord State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196,1203 (Utah 
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1995) (recognizing Belton authorizes officers to search arrested person and "his or 
her vehicle"); see also Aple Br. at 12-16,18-19 (discussing Wilson and Belton). The 
court of appeals7 held that the officers should have released the passengers— 
including returning their knives—before undertaking this indisputably lawful 
objective. See Baker, 2008 UT App 115, f 19 (holding "Baker was unlawfully 
detained from the moment the driver was placed under arrest"). Re-arming four 
passengers under these circumstances would make an already dangerous situation 
even more dangerous. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,1049 (1983) (recognizing 
that "roadside encounters between police [officers] and suspects are especially 
hazardous"); accord State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, f f 23-29,78 P.3d 590 (recognizing 
inherent dangerousness of all traffic stops). See also Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 
(recognizing danger even "greater when. . . passengers" also present). The Fourth 
Amendment does not require this. 
A. Officer safety concerns warrant detaining passengers until all the 
lawful objectives of a traffic stop are completed. 
It is well established that "[t]he touchstone of [any] analysis under the Fourth 
Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular 
governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security/" Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1964)). Reasonableness in this context 
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"depends 'on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to 
personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers/" Mimms, 434 U.S. 
at 109 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 873, 878 (1975)); see also 
Wilson, 519 U.S. at 411. And in all events it is "'unreasonable to require that police 
officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.'" Mimms, 434 U.S. 
at 110 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 23). 
Recent Supreme Court precedents make clear that officers making a stop or 
arrest must be allowed to control the situation. As noted above, the Supreme Court 
held in Wilson that the rule of Pennsylvania v. Mimms—that a driver may be ordered 
to exit a lawfully stopped vehicle—should be extended to include passengers. 
Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413-15. The Supreme Court observed in Wilson, that Michigan v. 
Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), "offers guidance by analogy." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414. 
In Summers, "as . . . police officers were about to execute a warrant to search a 
house for narcotics, they encountered [Summers] descending the front steps." 452 
U.S. at 693. At the officers request, Summers assisted them in gaining entry. Id. He 
was thereafter detained while the officers searched the house. Id. The Wilson Court 
noted that "[t]he question in [Summers] depended 'upon a deteraiination whether 
the officers had the authority to require [Summers] to re-enter the house and to 
remain there while they conducted their search.'" Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (quoting 
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Summers, 452 U.S. at 695). The Wilson Court emphasized that "'no special danger to 
the police [officers] [was] suggested by the evidence in [the Summers] record/" but 
that "'the execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction 
that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy 
evidence/" Id. (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 702). Additionally, the "'[t]he risk of 
harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely 
exercise unquestioned command of the situation/" Id. (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. 
at 703); see also Muehler v. Menu, 544 U.S. 93,98 (2005) (holding the officers' detention 
of Mena in handcuffs for duration of warrant-supported search of premises she 
occupied with others "was, under Summers, plainly permissible"). 
The Supreme Court's analogy to Summers in Wilson is instructive. Read 
together with Mena, these cases support the principle that police officers may detain 
persons that they encounter in premises they are lawfully entitled to search, until 
the search is completed. 
It is "too plain for argument" that the public's interest in officer safety "is both 
legitimate and weighty." Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110; see also Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413 
(noting "weighty interest in officer safety"). This important interest is of special 
significance in cases like this one because, as noted above, "traffic stops may be 
dangerous encounters." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413; see also Long, 463 U.S. at 1049 
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("roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous"); Foley 
v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291,298 (1978) (noting "the number of police officers wounded 
or killed in the process of making inquiry in borderline, seemingly minor violation 
situations" involving traffic infractions); Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110 (acknowledging the 
"inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an 
automobile"); accord Warren, 2003 UT 36, f f 23-29. And the "danger to an officer 
from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the 
driver in the stopped car." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414. 
These precedents suggest that passengers are reasonably detained incident 
to a traffic arrest until all the lawful objectives of the stop are completed, 
including a search of the passenger compartment. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 
(1981); accord Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1203 (recognizing Belton authorizes officers to 
search arrested person and "his or her vehicle"). 
The officer safety concerns underlying the Supreme Court's Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence in cases like Mimms, Summers, Long, and Wilson 
remain compelling today. In Long and Mimms, the Supreme Court relied on a 
1963 study showing that "approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when 
a police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile." Long, 463 U.S. at 
1048 n.13; Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110. In Wilson, the Supreme Court relied on 1994 
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statistics demonstrating that in that year 5,762 officers were assaulted and eleven 
were killed during traffic pursuits and stops. See 519 U.S. at 413. 
In the years since these cases were decided, the statistics on which the 
Supreme Court relied have remained consistent. The most recent data reveals 
that in 2006,6,490 officers were assaulted and eight were killed during traffic 
pursuits or stops. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: 
Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, Tables 19 & 66 (2006) ("Uniform 
Crime Reports") (found at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2006/tablel9.html & 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2006/table66.html).5 More than 40% of those 
assaults involved a dangerous weapon such as a gun or knife. See Uniform Crime 
Reports, Table 71 (found at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2006/table71.html). 
Utah law enforcement officers are not immune from this danger. See Sara 
Israelsen-Hartley, Lehi Officer shot: Police kill woman who opened fire, Deseret News, 
24 June 2008, and Melinda Rogers and Nate Carlisle, Woman killed after shooting 
5
 All eight of the murdered officers were killed during traffic violation stops. 
See Uniform Crime Reports, Table 19 
(http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2006/tablel9.html). Although the FBI has yet to 
release final statistics for 2007, preliminary data show that eleven officers were 
killed during traffic pursuits and stops that year. See Uniform Crime Reports, May 12, 
2008 Press Release (http://www.fbi.gov/ pressrel/pressrel08/leoka051208.htm). 
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Lehi cop had history of mental illness, The Salt Lake Tribune, 24 June 2008 (copies of 
both articles are attached in addendum D). 
Given the above, concerns about officer safety during traffic stops are 
weighty. Years of data establish the extreme danger that knives and other easily 
concealed weapons pose to officers making traffic stops, which danger is only 
increased when passengers are also present. Therefore, a rule permitting officers 
to detain passengers until the lawful objectives of the stop are completed, 
including searching the passenger compartment incident to an occupant's arrest, 
serves a vital public purpose. 
As for the personal liberty side of the ledger, as recognized in Wilson, "the 
case for passengers is in one sense stronger than that for the driver." 519 U.S. at 
413. For example, "[t]here is probable cause to believe that the driver has 
committed a minor vehicular offense, but there is no such reason to stop or 
detain the passengers/' Id. But "the additional intrusion on the passenger is 
minimal/' id. at 415, because, "as a practical matter, the passengers are already 
stopped by virtue of the stop of the vehicle." Id. at 413. As further recognized in 
Wilson, "the possibility of a violent encounter stems not from the ordinary 
reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that 
evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop." Id. at 
22 
414. Passengers will therefore be "every bit" as motivated as drivers "to employ 
violence to prevent apprehension of such a crime." Id. Accordingly, allowing 
officers to detain passengers until the passenger compartment is safely searched 
incident to an occupants7 arrest minimizes the risk of harm to both officers and 
vehicle occupants. Here, detaining passengers until after the passenger 
compartment is safely searched allows officers to protect themselves from any 
possible attack by released—and rearmed—passengers. 
As noted, the Supreme Court specifically declined in Wilson to decide 
whether "an officer may forcibly detain a passenger for the entire duration of the 
stop." 519 U.S. at 415 n.3. However, a majority of jurisdictions have since read 
Wilson to mean that those same safety concerns that justify police in ordering 
passengers out of a stopped vehicle also justify police in ordering passengers to 
remain in the vehicle during a traffic stop.6 See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 510 
R3d 788,791 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding officer's safety concerns far outweighed 
minimal intrusion of ordering passenger Sanders back into vehicle), cert, denied, 
128 S.Ct. 2072 (2008); United States v. Williams, 419 F.3d 1029,1034 (9th Cir. 2005) 
6
 Even before Wilson, at least one state court had extended Mimms to 
passengers, including law enforcement authority to order passengers "back inside 
the vehicle for safety purposes." State v. Webster, 824 R2d 768,770 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1991). 
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(recognizing officers' "need. . . to exercise control over individuals encountered 
during a traffic stop" justified ordering "passenger back into an automobile that 
he voluntarily exited"), cert, denied, 546 U.S. 1081 (2005); Rogala v. District of 
Columbia, 161 F.3d 44,53 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (recognizing "a police officer has the 
power to reasonably control the situation by requiring a passenger to remain in a 
vehicle during a traffic stop") (emphasis in original); United States v. Moorefield, 
111 F.3d 10,12-13 (3rd Cir. 1997) (affirming "police officers lawfully ordered 
passenger Moorefield to remain in the car and put his hands in the air while the 
traffic stop was being conducted"); Carter v. State, 494 S.E.2d 108,109410 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1997) (recognizing passenger's "detention]. . . while the officer completes 
the traffic stop" " is a minimal intrusion"); State v. Roberts, 943 P.2d 1249,1251 
(Mont. 1997) (holding "Roberts was not unlawfully detained when Officer Punt 
directed him to remain in the vehicle"); People v. Forbes, 728 N.Y.S.2d 64,66 (2001) 
(holding "it is within the discretion of the police officers on the scene to decide 
whether . . . to maintain the status quo by requiring the driver and passengers to 
remain in the vehicle until the traffic stop is over"); State v. Shearin, 612 S.E.2d 
371,378 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing "it is reasonable for an officer to 
decide that it is safer to have an occupant of a vehicle remain temporarily in the 
vehicle for the short duration of a lawful traffic stop"); State v. Hodges, 631 
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N.W.2d 206,210 & n.l (S.D. 2001) (recognizing "[f]or officer safety, it is 
reasonable to require the passengers in a lawfully stopped vehicle to remain at 
the scene until officer is able to assess the situation"); Harris v. Commonwealth, 500 
S.E.2d 257,261 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing "the Fourth Amendment permits 
the police to order the passengers to get out of the car pending the completion of 
the stop"). See also Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure §9.6(a), at 647 (4th ed. 
2004) ("Common sense suggests that, in the ordinary traffic stop situation, the 
officer is much better off (from the standpoint of ensuring against a surprise 
attack by a passenger) if the passengers remain in the stopped vehicle while the 
citation is prepared and other procedures incident to the stop are carried out"). 
But see Wilson v. State, 734 So.2d 1107,1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999), cert, denied, 
529 U.S. 1124 (2000). 
None of the above cases involves a situation exactly like that here, where 
officers are authorized to search the passenger compartment incident to a vehicle 
occupant's arrest. But the officer safety concerns undergirding these cases 
strongly support the principle that allowing police officers to detain passengers 
until this indisputably lawful objective is completed is reasonable. As reiterated 
by the Supreme Court in Brendlin, "'[t]he risk of harm to both the police and the 
occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command 
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of the situation.'"127 S.Ct. at 2407 ((quoting Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414) (in turn 
quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03)). 
B. In any event, defendant's detention was supported by reasonable 
suspicion that he may be armed and dangerous. 
For the reasons stated in Point 1(A) of this brief, defendant was reasonably 
detained until the officers could safely search the passenger compartment incident 
to the driver's arrest, even absent independent reasonable suspicion. However, 
although the officers did not need reasonable suspicion to detain defendant under 
this circumstance, they had it. As will be shown below, defendant was lawfully 
detained up until the time he was frisked, because the officers reasonably suspected 
that he may be armed and dangerous. 
In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the United States Supreme Court 
upheld the protective search of Long's car, and by implication, the prior frisk of 
his person, based on facts similar to this case. Long was investigated for a 
possible DUI, after two officers watched him swerve off the road into a ditch. Id. 
at 1035. Long met the approaching officers at the rear of his car, which was 
protruding from the ditch. Id. at 1035-36. Long was initially unresponsive to the 
officers requests for his license, but eventually turned and began walking toward 
the open driver's side door of his car. Id. at 1036. "The officers followed Long 
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and both observed a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver's side of 
the car." Id. The officers "stopped Long's progress and subjected him to a Terry 
protective pat-down, which revealed no weapons." Id. The officers also searched 
the interior of the passenger compartment for additional weapons, but instead 
found marijuana. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that the 
circumstances "clearly justified [the officers] in their reasonable belief that Long 
posed a danger if he were permitted to renter his vehicle." Id. at 1050. 
Specifically, the Supreme Court emphasized that "[t]he hour was late and 
the area rural." Id. Additionally, "Long was driving his automobile at excessive 
speed, and his car swerved into a ditch. The officers had to repeat their 
questions to Long, who appeared to be 'under the influence of some intoxicant." 
Id. The Supreme Court noted that Long "was not frisked until the officers 
observed that there was a large knife in the interior of the car into which Long 
was about to reenter." Id. Although the issue in Long was the propriety of the 
officers' limited search of Long's car for weapons, the Supreme Court observed 
that "[o]f course, [its] analysis would apply to justify the search of Long's person 
that was conducted by the officers after the discovery of the knife." Id. at 1051 
n.15. 
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Similarly, here, when Officer Robertson first approached the stopped 
vehicle he "noticed a knife in a leather sheath on the thigh of a passenger in the 
back seat." Baker, 2008 UT App 115, f 3. Given Long, this observation gave rise 
to reasonable suspicion for weapons frisks of the vehicle occupamts, including 
defendant, who was one of three back seat passengers. See Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 
1036,1046,1050-51 (1983); see also Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366,373 (2003) 
(noting "that 'a car passenger... will often be engaged in a common enterprise 
with the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the 
evidence of their wrongdoing" (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,304-
05 (1999))). 
Officer Robertson's observation of the knife in this case distinguishes it 
from State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,78 P.3d 590, upon which the court of appeals 
relies. See Baker, 2008 UT App 115, Tl 16-17 (discussing Warren). In Warren, this 
Court declined to uphold the weapons frisk in part because the officer in that 
case saw no weapons upon approaching Warren, or at any time during the traffic 
stop. 2003 UT 36, Tl 2-7,13. Here, however, Officer Robertson, like the officers 
in Long, saw the knife upon approaching the stopped vehicle. Baker, 2008 UT 
App 115, f 3. 
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The surrounding circumstances only added to reasonable suspicion that the 
vehicle occupants may be armed and dangerous: The hour was late, the area was 
dark, and Officer Robertson was outnumbered by the five vehicle occupants. See 
R71-69. Officer Robertson's reasonable suspicion continued to escalate when he 
learned the driver's license had been suspended for drugs, he found a knife on the 
driver in a search incident to her arrest, and his two backup officers retrieved twelve 
additional knives from the passengers. Id. Although up to three additional officers 
were variously on the scene, the officers were always outnumbered by the five 
vehicle occupants. Id. See Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (holding danger to officers 
increases when passengers present). Finally, as recognized by this Court, traffic 
stops are inherently dangerous. Warren, 2003 UT 36,f 32. Thus, considering the 
totality of the circumstances, even prior to the drug-dog alerting on the passenger 
compartment, the officers here had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant 
may be armed and dangerous.7 Id. at % 14. 
Given that any detention of defendant beyond the initial purpose of the traffic 
stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, it was not for the court of appeals to 
rr 
The reasonableness of the weapons frisk of defendant, which was not ultimately 
performed until after the drug-dog alerted on the passenger compartment, is 
discussed in Point II of this brief. 
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second-guess the officers as to the timing of the weapons frisk. Reviewing courts 
should be wary of "allow[ing] the theoretical, sanitized world of [their] imagination 
to replace the dangerous and complex world that policemen face every day/7 Smith 
v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343,347 (6th Cir. 1992). "What constitutes 'reasonable' action 
may seem quite different to someone facing a possible assailant than to someone 
analyzing the question at leisure." Id.; see also People v. Wilson, 59 Cal. App. 4th 1053, 
1063 (1997) (recognizing "[a]ppellate courts have repeatedly emphasized it is 
inappropriate for judges to second-guess on-the-spot decisions of officers in the 
field"). Here, the officers reasonably deemed it safer to keep the passengers under 
control inside the vehicle while waiting for the K-9 unit, rather than to attempt to 
remove and frisk them even as the K-9 unit arrived and went to work. 
In sum, the business incident to the arrest of the driver was not complete until 
the passenger compartment was searched. Defendant was frisked before the officers 
could safely search the passenger compartment. Therefore, defendant was lawfully 
detained at the time he was frisked. In any event, although not required, 
defendant's detention was also justified by a reasonable suspicion that he may be 
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armed and dangerous. Long, 463 U.S. at 1046,1050-51. The court of appeals opinion 
should therefore be reversed. 
The court of appeals focused its analysis on the approximately one-minute 
period between the time driver was placed in the patrol car and the arrival of the K-
9 unit. Baker, 2008 UT App 115, Tl 12-13. Even assuming, as the court of appeals 
did, that Officer Robertson finished processing the driver's arrest and that all the 
knives were retrieved approximately one minute before the K-9 unit arrived, this 
slight delay was de minimis. See, e.g.,United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998,1002 (8th 
Cir. 2005) (holding thirty second to two minute detention for dog sniff was de 
minimis); United States .v Carpenter, 406 F.3d 915, 916-17 (7th cir. 2005) (holding 
possible five minute wait for drug-detection dog not unreasonable); Hugueley v. 
Dresden Police Department, 469 F.Supp.2d 507,513 (W.D. Term. 2007) (upholding two 
and one-half minute dog sniff); United States v. Herera Martinez, 354 F.3d 932, 934 
(8th Cir. 2004) (holding "short detention for dog sniff after completion of traffic stop 
[does not] violate the Fourth Amendment"), vacated on other grounds, Martinez v. 
United States, 127 S.Ct. 1125 (2007); United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 
F.3d 643,649 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding thirty-second to two-minute detention for 
dog sniff); State v. Box, 73 P.3d 623,630 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (upholding post-traffic 
stop dog sniff on ground Box "only slightly inconvenienced when he was further 
detained for less than a minute while the dog sniffed his vehicle"); State v. Griffin, 
949 So.2d 309,315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (holding in regard to suspicionless dog 
sniff, that "[i]f any intrusion into [Griffin's] liberty interests occurred, it was de 
minimis and, therefore, not unconstitutional"); State v. De La Rosa, 657 N.W.2d 683, 
687 (S.D. 2003) (holding dog sniff conducted after traffic stop ended not 
unreasonable because "sniffing activity was of short duration," or a"matter of 
seconds"). 
(Footnote continued on next page). 
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II. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION 
AND APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
RELATING TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH 
SEARCHES FOR WEAPONS MAY BE CONDUCTED. 
The reasonable suspicion that justified defendant's extended detention, see 
Point 1(A), also justified the weapons frisk of his person. A majority of the court of 
appeals' disagreed, however, holding that the confiscation of thirteen knives, among 
other circumstances, did not support objective reasonable suspicion that defendant 
may be armed and dangerous. Baker, 2008 UT App 115,f18 (holding "nothing 
other than the knives gave police officers any reason to take precautionary steps"); 
see also id. at \ \ 20,29 (Thorne, J., concurring) (declining to address whether frisk 
was justified for officer safety reasons, deeming it "illegal solely" because length and 
scope of prior detention unreasonable). 
In any event, the real question is by whether the officers were authorized 
under the Fourth Amendment to detain defendant from the moment the driver was 
placed under arrest until defendant was frisked. For the reasons set forth in the 
body of this point, including weighty officer safety concerns, the officers were 
justified in detaining defendant until the business incident to the driver's arrest, 
including safely searching the passenger compartment, was completed. The 
passenger compartment search was completed prior to defendant's frisk; therefore, 
defendant was lawfully detained at the time. Alternatively, as set forth in Point II of 
this brief, the officers were justified in detaining defendant during the traffic stop 
because they reasonably suspected that he may be armed and dcingerous. 
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As shown in Point I of this brief, for reasons of officer safety, officers exercise 
''unquestioned command" over passengers during a traffic stop, Brendlin, 127 S.Ct. 
at 2407 (quoting Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (in turn quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 703)). 
Nevertheless, a weapons frisk may not be conducted absent individual suspicion 
that a detainee may be armed and dangerous. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. The 
reasonableness of a weapons frisk is evaluated objectively, according to the totality 
of the circumstances. Warren, 2003 UT 36, % 14. "To determine reasonableness, a 
court should question whether 'the facts available to the officer at the moment of the 
seizure or search "warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief" that the 
action was appropriate/" Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22). An officer's 
subjective interpretation of the facts " is one of several possible articulable facts a 
court may consider as part of the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 121. Finally, 
"[c]ourts must view the articulable facts in their totality and avoid the temptation to 
divide the facts and evaluate them in isolation from each other." Id. at f 1 4 (citing 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274). 
Here, as explained in Point 1(A) of this brief, the officers had reasonable 
suspicion to believe that defendant may be armed and dangerous and the weapons 
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frisk of his person was therefore justified.9 According to the court of appeals, 
however, "nothing other than the knives gave police officers any reason to take 
precautionary steps," and thus the weapons frisk of defendant was unjustified. 
Baker, 2008 UT App 115, \ 18 (emphasis added). In so holding, the court of appeals 
emphasized that (1) the knives were confiscated prior to the weapons frisk, (2) the 
officers expressed no concern for their individual safety, and (3) and one officer 
"admitted that 'the reasons that [the officers] decided to search... [defendant] was 
not because [the officers] were afraid for [their] safety,'" but rather "'to search for 
drugs and contraband.'" Baker, 2008 UT App 115, \ 18; see also id. at f17 . 
Contrary to the court of appeals' opinion, the totality of the circumstances in 
this case gives rise to objective reasonable suspicion that defendant may be armed 
and dangerous and that the weapons frisk of his person was therefore justified. 
9
 This term, the United States Supreme Court will consider whether police 
officers may subject a passenger to a weapons frisk where, as here, the officers have 
reasonable suspicion to believe the passenger is armed and dangerous, but where 
the officers do not suspect that the passenger is or has committed a criminal offense: 
In the context of a vehicular stop for a minor traffic infraction, may an 
officer conduct a pat-down search of a passenger when the officer has 
an articulable basis to believe the passenger might be armed and 
presently dangerous, but has no reasonable grounds to believe that the 
passenger is committing, or has committed a criminal offense. 
Arizona v. Johnson, 07-1122. See http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/07-
1122.htm. 
34 
Warren, 2003 UT 36,f14 (reiterating pertinent query: "whether 'the facts available 
to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search "warrant a [person] of 
reasonable caution in the belief" that the action was appropriate'" (quoting Terry, 
392 U.S. at 21-22)). 
The court of appeals' first rational for refusing to uphold the frisk was that the 
knives were already confiscated when the frisk occurred, and thus, the knives did 
not give rise to reasonable suspicion that defendant may be "'armed and presently 
dangerous/" Baker, 2008 UT App 115,f17 (quoting Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 29). On 
the contrary, the existence of the knives increased, rather than decreased, concerns 
for officer safety. Just because defendant and the other passengers had relinquished 
some knives, did not mean that they had relinquished all of their weapons, or that 
the officers were bound to believe that they had. See, e.g., State v. Beach, 2002 UT 
App 160, \ 11,47 P.3d 932 (recognizing officer not bound to accept Beach's innocent 
explanation); State v. McLean, 1999 UT App 114U, 1999 WL 33244734, *3 (recognizing 
officer "was not required to take the word of the driver that the weapons were 
unloaded, nor did he have to wait for a passenger to make a threatening move 
before he checked the weapons to assure his own safety"); see also State v. Applegate, 
2008 UT 63,112, P.3d (recognizing officer "was not required . . . to rule out 
innocent conduct"). 
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Moreover, if the confiscation of thirteen knives under these circumstances 
does not give rise to objective reasonable suspicion that the vehicle occupants may 
be armed and dangerous, it is difficult to imagine any circumstances that would. 
For example, this Court declined to uphold the weapons frisk in Warren, 2003 UT 36, 
in part, because the lone officer in that case testified that Warren "did nothing to 
cause [him] to be alarmed and that he had no reason to believe that Warren was 
armed and dangerous/' 2003 UT 36,132. As noted previously, however, the officer 
in Warren saw no weapons upon approaching Warren, or at any time during the 
traffic stop. Id. at 112-7. Cf. Long, 463 U.S. at 1046,1050-51 (upholding protective 
search of Long's car, and by implication, prior frisk of his person incident to DUI 
investigation, because it was late at night in a rural area and a hunting knife was 
seen on car floor). Thus, in declining to uphold the frisk in Warren, this Court 
recognized that "the case was a difficult one/' in part, because it "lackjed] the kind 
of obvious articulable facts that would make the determination easier[.]" Warren, 
2003 UT 36,1130,33. Given the thirteen knives ultimately relinquished to officers 
here, this case, unlike Warren, does not lack obvious articulable facts that make the 
determination easier. Id. at 113. 
Additionally, the objective basis for concern here—the confiscated 
knives— is made all the more reasonable after the drug-dog alerted on the rear 
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driver's side passenger handle. The drug-dog alert reasonably suggested not 
only that the driver's involvement in drugs may be ongoing, but that it may also 
involve her passengers. See Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373 (noting "that 'a car passenger 
. . . will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the 
same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing" 
(quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,304-05 (1999))). Although the exact 
amount of drugs inside the vehicle was then unknown to the officers, "a [person] 
of reasonable caution," Warren, 2003 UT 36, % 14 (case citation and quotation 
marks omitted), would reasonably be concerned that the vehicle occupants 
possessed the confiscated knives for nefarious, rather than innocuous, purposes. 
See United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185,1195 (10th Cir. 2004) (frisk permissible, 
as officer reasonably suspected defendant "involved in drug dealing," a crime 
"typically associated with some sort of weapon"). 
The court of appeals' second rational for refusing to uphold the frisk was that 
that the officers expressed no "heightened fear for their safety." Baker, 2008 UT App 
115, 1 18. Defense counsel did elicit affirmations from Officers Bartell and 
Robertson that they were not in subjective fear for their safety despite recovering the 
large number of knives because the passengers' behavior had been non-threatening. 
See R150:13, 31. But Officer Robertson also testified that officer safety is an ever-
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present concern. R150:31. Officer Rockwood similarly testified that the passengers7 
behavior had not alarmed him, but also emphasized that he remained concerned 
about the large number of knives retrieved from the vehicle occupants. R150:21-23. 
Moreover, Officer Robertson's and Officer Rockwood's testimony reasonably 
suggests that the reason the officers were not subjectively fearful for their individual 
safety—despite the unusual number of knives—was precisely because they were 
taking appropriate safety precautions in confiscating the knives for the duration of 
the traffic stop. Thus, as correctly recognized by the trial court, the knives, in 
conjunction with the other circumstances of the stop, compelled the conclusion that 
the weapons frisk was objectively reasonable, even if defendant was cooperative. 
See R71-69. 
Finally, the court of appeals' third rational for refusing to uphold the frisk 
was that Officer Robertson was primarily motivated to search for drugs. Baker, 2008 
UT App 115, % 18. The court of appeals erred by including the officers' subjective 
motivations in the reasonable suspicion analysis: "[t]he officer's subjective 
motivation is irrelevant." Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006); see also 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1135 (holding traffic stop based on either observed violation, or 
reasonable suspicion of violation, is constitutionally justified, "despite the officer's 
motivations or suspicions that are unrelated to the traffic offense"); Warren, 2003 UT 
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36,114 (holding reasonableness is determined by asking whether the facts available 
at the time of the search would "'warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the 
belief that the action taken was appropriate") (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22)). It 
is well established that the reasonableness of officer conduct is judged against an 
objective standard. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22; Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 
137 (1978). Under this standard, as noted above, an officer's motivation for acting is 
irrelevant See Scott, 436 U.S. at 138 (holding searches are examined "without regard 
to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved"). An officer's 
subjective understanding of the legal justification for acting is also irrelevant. Accord 
Scott, 436 U.S. at 138 (holding "the fact that the officer does not have the state of 
mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for 
the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, 
viewed objectively, justify that action"); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 
(2004)(same); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,813 (1996)(same); United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,236 (1973) (holding "it is of no moment that [the officer]... 
did not himself suspect that respondent was armed"); see also Applegate, 2008 UT 63, 
*[ 20 (recognizing officer's "subjective understanding of the law is irrelevant). 
In sum, if left intact, the court of appeals' decision forces police officers into a 
Catch 22: they can choose to protect themselves and risk suppression of any 
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contraband they discover during a weapons frisk, or they can choose not to protect 
themselves and risk attack by armed detainees. This imsound holding should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the court of appeals' 
opinion. 
Respectfully submitted 17 September 2008. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
// • 
DECKER 
ssistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Petitioner 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v. Case No. 20080351-SC 
Luke Zachary Baker, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
certiorari, filed on April 24, 2008. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 4 5 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issues: 
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction or 
application of the Fourth Amendment as to the permissible length 
and scope of detention of passengers in a vehicle that police 
have stopped. 
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction or 
application of the Fourth Amendment relating to the circumstances 
under which searches for weapons may be conducted. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
its issuance. 
For The Court: 
Dated n-n-oy 
Matthew B. Durrant 
Associate Chief Justice 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LUKE ZACHARY BAKER, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 041403985 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence obtained 
by the State of Utah in the instant case. The Court having carefully considered the Motions and 
Memoranda and in response to counsels' request for a decision based solely on the pleadings, now 
makes the following Ruling and Order. 
I. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. The Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support Thereof on 
December 13, 2004. 
2. The State filed its Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress on December 27, 2004. 
3. The Defendant filed its Reply to the State's Response on January 10,2005. 
4. On February 9,2005, the Court held a Suppression Hearing, where testimony was presented 





The facts relied on herein were adduced from testimony at both the preliminary hearing and 
the suppression hearing. 
in, 
ANALYSIS & RULING 
1. Initial Detention 
First of all, police officers have considerable discretion to protect officer safety, including 
having passengers exit a vehicle while the traffic stop is being conducted. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 
U.S. 408,415(1997). This can logically be extended to pennitting officers to have passengers remain 
inside the vehicle during the stop. However, the litmus test for whether an individual has been 
detained "depends on when the person reasonably feels detained, not on when the police officer 
thinks the person is no longer free to leave." State v. PatefiekL 927 P.2d 655,659 (Utah App. 1996) 
(emphasis added). 
Furthermore, "the subjective intention of the [officer] is irrelevant except insofar as they may 
have been conveyed to the [defendant]." U.S. v. MendenhalL 446 U.S. 544. 554 n.6 (1980). Such 
a detention occurs when an "officer engages in conduct which a reasonable person would view as 
threatening or offensive even if performed by another private citizen." Salt Lake City v. Ray, 998 
P.2d 274, 278 (Utah App. 2000). Hence, it is an objective test that balances the totality of the 
circumstances that the alleged detainee is faced with. Finally, a canine sniff conducted during a 
concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that 
no individual has any right to possess, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Illinois v. Caballes, 
2 
543 U.S. (2005) (Slip Opinion). 
Although the time line of this traffic stop is somewhat blurry, it appears that the stop was 
initiated very early in the morning on September 30, 2004, that the K-9 was requested at 1:21 a.m., 
that the K-9 arrived at 1:34 a.m., and the Defendant was searched and arrested at 1:45 a.m. The 
request for the K-9 coincided with the discovery that the driver's hcense had been suspended for 
drugs. Notably, the Defendant does not make any attenuation challenge to the actual time length of 
the stop or in connection with the K-9 request, etc. 
The K-9 arrived soon after the driver was placed under arrest in the police car; the significance 
of the K-9 is discussed infra. In sum, it was dark, extremely early in the morning, there were five 
occupants, two knives had already been found, and the officers were dealing with the driver and her 
arrest until the K-9 arrived. Furthermore, the officers never told the Defendant that he was not free 
to leave, although he testified that he subjectively believed that (which is irrelevant). Under these 
circumstances, the Defendant was not "detained" for purposes of Fourth Amendment protections to 
be triggered. 
2. Canine Sniff 
A positive alert by a police-trained drug-detecting canine "is sufficient to establish probable 
cause" to search. U.S. v. Patten, 183 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 1999). The only exception to this general 
rule seems to be if the dog has a poor accuracy record with a history of false alerts. U.S. v. Ludwig. 
10 F.3d 1523, 1527-28 (10th Cir. 1993). Officers with probable cause may conduct a warrantless 
search of the passenger compartment of a car, including its occupants, pursuant to the automobile 
exception to the Fourth Amendment. U.S. v. Ross. 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982); U.S. v. Barbee. 968 
3 
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F.2d 1026,1030 (10th Cir. 1992). 
In this case, the facts are undisputed that the K-9 unit, which responded to the scene 13 
minutes after it was called, alerted to the exterior of the vehicle that the Defendant was traveling in. 
Ironically, Defense Counsel argued at the Suppression Hearing that the canine sniff is legally 
insufficient to establishing probable cause. This flies in the face of the aforementioned well-
established case law, which holds the contrary position. Because the case law is clear and because 
the Defendant has failed to challenge the canine's accuracy record, the Court finds that the Defendant 
was properly searched incident to the probable cause derived from the positive canine alert. 
3. Terry Frisk - Police Safety 
The "danger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers 
in addition to the driver in the stopped car." Maryland, 519 U.S. at 414. Furthermore, "[w]here a 
police officer validly stops an individual for investigatory or other purposes and reasonably believes 
that the individual may be armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a cfrisk' or 'pat-down* 
search of the individual to discover weapons that might be used against him." State v. Lafond, 68 
P.3d 1043,1049 (Utah App. 2003) (citing State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656,659 (Utah 1985)) (emphasis 
added); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). An officer's reasonable belief that an individual 
may be armed and dangerous is not necessarily assuaged by the Defendant's assurances. In State v. 
McLean, the Utah Court of Appeals noted that the officer "was not required to take the word of the 
driver that the weapons were unloaded, nor did he have to wait for a passenger to make a threatening 




Officer Mike Bartell, who retrieved the knives, testified that he recovered about 12 knives 
from the passengers, including a set of throwing knives. Officer Chris Lavar Rockwood, who arrived 
to assist Officer Raymond Robertson, conducted the Terry frisk of the Defendant. Before conducting 
the frisk, Officer Rockwood had observed "quite a few," "more than five" knives that had been taken 
from the vehicle and that they "ranged [in size] from pocket knives to large knives." He also admitted 
that while there had been no overt threats from the passengers, he still had a concern for officer safety 
after observing the large number of knives. 
In addition, Officer Robertson testified that it was a rare case to retrieve 12-13 knives from 
a vehicle. The sheer number of knives alerted the officers that it was reasonable to conclude that 
there might be other weapons. Officer Robertson testified that he is always concerned about officer 
safety, though he personally had no fear at this scene for his own safety. Furthermore, the Court 
emphasizes that it was dark, around 1:30 a.m., and there were a total of five occupants in the vehicle. 
In sum, the Terry frisk of the Defendant did not occur until after: 
a. The driver had been placed under arrest, 
b. 12-13 knives had been retrieved from the passengers and driver, including some large 
knives, 
c. A police-trained drug-detection canine alerted to the trunk and the rear door of the 
vehicle. The Court also notes that the Defendant was a passenger in the rear seat at 
the time. 
In light of these facts, frankly, it could not be much more clear that the officers reasonably 
believed that the Defendant and the other passengers were armed and dangerous. When the police 
initially approached the vehicle, they noted that one of the occupants in the back seat was armed with 
5 
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a large knife. Additionally, when the driver was searched incident to arrest for driving on a 
suspended license, another knife was found on her. After the officers requested that the passengers 
turn over any other knives they had on them, a total of 13 knives were recovered, including at least 
one from the Defendant. The Defendant argues that after these additional knives were * Voluntarily" 
produced, the police no longer had a reasonable belief that the Defendant was armed or dangerous. 
However, this Court finds that such an argument fails to have any merit in the context of this traffic 
stop. As a result, the officers conducted a proper Terry frisk of the Defendant. 
IV. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing discussion and analysis, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby denied. 




Honcfrable Lynn WsDavis.1" - ./;* y 
Fourth District Court Judged * ^ 
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State v. Baker 
Utah App.,2008. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Luke Zachary BAKER, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20060218-CA. 
April 3, 2008. 
Certiorari Granted July 11, 2008. 
Background: Defendant was convicted on a con-
ditional guilty plea in the Fourth District Court, 
Provo Department, Lynn W. Davis, J., of posses-
sion of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone 
and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free 
zone, and defendant appealed denial of his motion 
to suppress. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Davis, J., held that: 
(1) detention of defendant was not supported by 
reasonable particularized suspicion of criminal 
activity, and 
(2) protective frisk of defendant was not objectively 
reasonable. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Thome, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
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Before THORNE, 
ORME, JJ. 
Associtae P.J., DAVIS, and 
OPINION 
DAVIS, Judge: 
U 1 Appellant Luke Zachary Baker entered a Sery 
plea after the trial court denied his motion to sup-
press. See generally State v. Sery, 758 P 2d 935, 
937-40 (Utah Ct.App.1988). Baker contends that 
the trial court improperly denied his motion to sup-
press because, he asserts, from the moment the of-
ficers placed the driver under arrest, Baker, a pas-
senger in the driver's vehicle, was unlawfully de-
tained. We agree, and thus reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND ™ 
FN1. "We recite the facts in detail because 
the legal analysis in a search and seizure 
case is highly fact dependent." State v. 
Warren, 2003 UT 36, ^ 2, 78 P.3d 590 
(citing State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ 5, 
63 P.3d 650). 
| 2 In the early morning hours of September 30, 
2004, Baker was riding in the backseat*937 of a car 
traveling through Pleasant Grove, Utah. Pleasant 
Grove Police Officer Raymond Robertson noticed 
the car's license plate was not illuminated. Accord-
ingly, he initiated a traffic stop. 
| 3 As he approached the vehicle, Officer 
Robertson noticed a knife in a leather sheath on the 
thigh of a passenger in the back seat. At approxim-
ately 1:21 a.m., Officer Robertson ran a warrants 
check on the driver and discovered that her license 
had been "suspended for drugs." Officer Robertson 
then called for a K-9 unit to check the vehicle for 
controlled substances. Officer Robertson testified at 
the preliminary hearing that there was "no other 
reason" for requesting the K-9 unit. After he fin-
ished talking to dispatch, Officer Robertson walked 
back to the vehicle and proceeded to arrest the driver. 
H 4 Responding to dispatch, additional officers-
Pleasant Grove Police Officer Mike Bartell and Or-
em City Police Officer Chris Rockwood-arrived on 
the scene to assist Officer Robertson. By the time 
»2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Officer Bartell arrived, the driver was already out 
of the vehicle and under arrest. Officer Robertson 
informed the other officers of the knife, and Officer 
Bartell proceeded to seize the knife while Officer 
Robertson processed the driver. 
f 5 Officer Bartell then spoke to the backseat pas-
senger whom Officer Robertson had seen with the 
knife. This passenger volunteered that he had a 
knife sitting on his thigh. Officer Bartell responded 
that he "better take the knife until we fmish up with 
the stop." Officer Bartell then asked the passengers 
if there were any more knives in the car. The pas-
sengers, including Baker, then handed Officer Bar-
tell approximately twelve other knives, including a 
set of throwing knives. Officer Bartell testified at 
the suppression hearing that none of the passengers 
said or did anything to make him fear for his safety 
once the knives were confiscated. Officers Rock-
wood and Robertson concurred with this assess-
ment. Yet Officer Robertson testified at the prelim-
inary hearing that the passengers were not free to 
leave until the K-9 unit arrived. 
f 6 At approximately 1:33 a.m., Officer Robertson 
placed the driver in the back of his patrol car, and 
at 1:34 a.m., Orem City Police Officer Art Lopez 
arrived with a police service dog. At this time, 
Baker and his three remaining riding companions 
were still seated in the vehicle with the engine 
turned off. The dog then sniffed around the car and 
indicated that it smelled drugs. Accordingly, Of-
ficer Rockwood frisked the passengers and found a 
glass pipe in Baker's pants pocket and another in 
his shoe. At the suppression hearing, Officer 
Robertson testified that the reason the officers 
searched Baker was not because they were afraid 
for their safety, but was instead because they 
wanted to check for drugs and contraband. Baker 
was then placed in handcuffs and taken to the po-
lice station. In the process of booking Baker, police 
officers found a bag containing seventy-one grams 
of methamphetamine. 
K 7 Baker was charged with possession of a con-
trolled substance in a drug-free zone and possession 
© 2008 Thomson ReutersAVest. 
of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone. Baker 
moved to suppress the evidence of the glass pipes 
and methamphetamine. After a hearing, the trial 
court denied Baker's Motion to Suppress. The trial 
court ruled that given the lateness of the hour, the 
number of passengers, the number of knives, and 
the ongoing arrest of the driver, Baker "was not 
'detained' for the purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment." Using the same set of facts, with the addi-
tion of the K-9 unit's detection of drugs, the trial 
court similarly ruled that "it could not be much 
more clear that the officers reasonably believed that 
[Baker] and the other passengers were armed and 
dangerous." FN: Baker now appeals the denial of 
his Motion to Suppress. 
FN2. The trial court also stated that Baker 
"[did] not make any attenuation challenge 
to the actual time length of the stop or in 
connection with the K-9 request, etc." 
However, Baker preserved his challenge to 
the unlawful nature of the detainment in 
his Motion to Suppress, stating that "[h]e 
was detained without either probable cause 
or reasonable suspicion, both before and 
after the K-9 unit arrived." 
*938 ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1] f 8 Baker argues that the trial court erred by 
denying his Motion to Suppress. "On review of 
both criminal and civil proceedings, we accept the 
trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous." Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 
1172 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Ison, 2006 UT 
26, % 22, 135 P.3d 864 (defining a factual finding). 
"We review the trial court's ruling on a motion to 
suppress for correctness, without deference to the 
trial court's application of the law to the facts." 
Lay ton City v. Oliver, 2006 UT App 244, % 11, 139 
P.3d 281 (citing State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, <[ 15, 
103P.3d699).FN3 
FN3. Baker also contends that even if the 
trial court properly ruled on the suppres-
sion motion respecting the Fourth Amend-
Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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ment, we should reverse because the police 
officers' actions violated Baker's rights un-
der article 1, section 14 of the Utah Consti-
tution. See Utah Const, art. I, § 14. Be-
cause Baker makes this argument for the 
first time on appeal, we decline to address 
it. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1216 
(Utah 1993) ("Utah appellate courts gener-
ally will not address a state constitutional 
argument made for the first time on ap-
peal"). 
ANALYSIS 
f 9 Baker argues that he was unlawfully detained 
from the moment the driver was arrested and that 
he was illegally frisked. We analyze each argument 
separately. 
I. The Detention 
[2][3][4][5] H 10uWhen a police officer makes a 
traffic stop, the driver of the car [and the passen-
gers are] seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment." Brendlin v. California, — U.S. — , 
— , 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2403, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007). 
Thus, both driver and passenger "may challenge the 
constitutionality of the stop." Id "[A] seizure oc-
curs if 'in view of all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the incident, a reasonable person would 
have believed that he was not free to leave.' "Id. at 
2405 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 
(1980)); accord State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 
(Utah Ct.App.1990). "When challenged, the [S]tate 
has the burden of proving the reasonableness of the 
officer's actions during an investigative detention." 
State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, % 23, 164 P.3d 397 
(citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-500, 
103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); United 
States v. Carhee, 27 F.3d 1493, 1496 & n. 2 (10th 
Cir.1994)). 
[6][7][8][9][10][11] J 11 "Due to the mobile nature 
of vehicles and their highly-regulated status, per-
sons traveling in vehicles have a lesser expectation 
of privacy than they would have within a private 
dwelling." State v. James, 2000 UT 80, «| 10, 13 
P.3d 576. And "officers may temporarily detain a 
vehicle and its occupants upon reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity for the purpose of conducting a 
limited investigation of the suspicion." ht This 
"articulable suspicion" must be "that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime; however 
the detention must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop." State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 
(Utah 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, ] 15, 107 
P.3d 706 ("No person may be detained except upon 
reasonable suspicion, and the scope of the detention 
must be limited to addressing the articulated 
grounds for the stop."). "The articulable facts sup-
porting reasonable suspicion are usually grounded 
in an officer's personal perceptions and inferences" 
but may also include external information. Kays-
ville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231. 234 (Utah 
Ct.App.1997). "[W]e 'look to the totality of the cir-
cumstances ... to determine if there was an object-
ive basis for suspecting criminal activity.' "State v. 
Beach, 2002 UT App 160, K 8, 47 P.3d 932 
(omission in original) (quoting State v. Humphrey, 
937 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah CtApp.1997)). 
"Investigative acts that are not reasonably related to 
dispelling or resolving the articulated grounds for 
the stop are permissible only if they do 'not add to 
the delay already lawfully experienced' and do 'not 
represent any further intrusion on [the detainee's] 
rights.' "Chism, 2005 UT App 41, TJ 15, 107 P.3d 
706 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); see 
also United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 561 
(10th Cir.1994) (finding the detention unlawful 
once the officer had discovered that *939 detainee's 
car's registration sticker "was valid and had not ex-
pired"); Chum, 2005 UT App 41, T 17, 107 P.3d 
706 (determining that continued detention of a de-
fendant was unlawful when the officer provided 
"no specific, articulable facts supporting his unwill-
ingness to accept the date of birth on [the defend-
ant's] license"); State v. Bissegger, 2003 UT App 
> 2008 Thomson ReutersAVest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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256,1R| 19-20, 76 P 3d 178 (holding that detaining a 
motorist on suspicion of intoxicated driving after 
successful performance of field sobriety tests was 
unlawful, and therefore unreasonable) 
[12] f 12 Here, the State, citing Maryland v 
Pringle 540 L S 366 124 S Ct 795, 157 LEd2d 
769 (2003), argues that the K-9 unit search was part 
and parcel of the traffic stop and hence Baker was 
not unlawfully detained However, the driver was 
arrested well before the K-9 unit arrived Placmg 
her in the patrol car, which occurred only a minute 
before the K-9 unit was on the scene, was, at best, a 
ministerial act We see no lawful reason why the 
passengers were detamed while the officers awaited 
the arrival of the K-9 unit The constitution, not the 
speed with which police officers dispatch then" du-
ties, determines when an arrest occurs Cf Nor-
wood, 2007 UT 47 H 24 n 31, 164 P 3d 397 
U 13 Moreover, the desire to check the vehicle for 
controlled substances did not require the presence 
of the passengers,rM yet Officer Robertson admit-
ted that the passengers were not free to leave while 
the K-9 unit was en route Thus, the officers needed 
some reasonable articulable suspicion to lawfully 
detain Baker and the other passengers while await-
ing the K-9 umt's arrival At the time Officer 
Robertson requested a K-9 unit, the officers had 
seen only one knife in a passenger's possession (and 
not in Baker's possession) While it was the early 
morning hours, and there were four passengers in 
the car, nothing m the officers' testimony mdicates 
any particularized suspicion involving cnmmal 
activity on the part of the passengers, thus, contin-
ued detention was impermissibleFNb See State v 
Chapman, 921 P 2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996) 
(determining that continued detention of the de-
fendant was impermissible when "[b]y the officers' 
own testimony, no mdependent facts surrounding 
the encounter with [the defendant] created suspi-
cion that he was mvolved in any illegal activity 
beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]"), cf 
Pi ingle 540 US at 373, 124 S Ct 795 
(determining that the large amount of money and 
drugs in the car made it "reasonable for the officer 
to infer a common [criminal] enterprise among the 
three [occupants of the car]"), Vmttd States v Di 
Re, 3^2 U S 581, ^93-94, 68 S Ct 222 92 L Ed 
210 (1948) (stating that where police officers have 
no evidence or information implicating a suspect, 
"mere presence" m the car does not give officers 
probable cause to believe that a suspect was in-
volved m a crime) Accordmgly, we hold that 
Baker's detention following the driver's arrest was 
m violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and 
that all evidence subsequently recovered must be 
excluded See State v Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 1 62, 
63 P 3d 650, State v Larocco 794 P 2d 460, 472 
(Utah 1990) 
FN4 We note that Illinois \ Caballes, 543 
U S 405, 125 SCt 834 160 LEd2d 842 
(2005), in which a dog sniff was upheld as 
constitutional, is distinguishable from the 
present case because the K-9 officer m 
Caballes arrived and walked his dog 
around the car while an officer "was m the 
process of writing a warning ticket,"/^ at 
406, 125 S Ct 834 The Court recognized 
that "[a] seizure that is justified solely by 
the interest in issumg a warning ticket to 
the driver can become unlawful if it is pro-
longed beyond the tune reasonably re-
quired to complete that mission" Id at 
407, 125 S Ct 834 The Court went on to 
contrast the facts in Caballes with those of 
People v Cox 202 111 2d 462, 270 111 Dec 
81, 782 NE2d 275 (2002), where "a dog 
sniff occurred during an unreasonably 
prolonged traffic stop," which the Court 
determined to be "an unconstitutional 
seizure" Caballes, 543 U S at 407-08, 
125 S Ct 834 Also, Caballes did not in-
volve passengers See id at 406, 125 S Ct 
834 Accordingly, the Caballes holdmg 
does not apply to the present case 
FN5 The record does not suggest, and the 
State does not contend, that possession of 
© 2008 Thomson ReutersAVest No Claim to Ong US Gov Works 
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the knives was itself illegal. 
II. The Frisk 
[13] f 14 The State argues that even if the officers 
had no reasonable articulable suspicion of any 
criminal activity on the part of the passengers, the 
frisk of Baker was *940 warranted because, as the 
trial court ruled, "the officers reasonably believed 
that [Baker] and the other passengers were armed 
and dangerous." This ruling by the trial court was 
based on the following findings: it was dark, it was 
late at night, the driver had been arrested, there 
were four passengers who had been in possession of 
approximately thirteen knives, and a K-9 unit had 
detected controlled substances where the three pas-
sengers (including Baker) sat. 
[14][15][16] f 15 "The sole purpose" of a Terry 
frisk "is to protect the officer ... by neutralizing po-
tential weapons." State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ^ 
13, 78 P.3d 590 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 
1032, 1049 n. 14, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 
(1983); Tenv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24, 88 S.Ct. 
1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).FN6 " Tf a protect-
ive search goes beyond what is necessary to de-
termine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid 
under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed.' "Id. 
(quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 
373, 113 S.Ct 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993)). 
"When probable cause is required, the [U.S. Su-
preme] Court has held that a lack of subjective be-
lief cannot invalidate an otherwise objectively reas-
onable action." Id. 1[ 16. An officer's subjective in-
terpretation that "a person may be armed and dan-
gerous, like an officer's subjective interpretation of 
the facts to determine that a crime has been or is 
being committed, is one of several possible articul-
able facts a court may consider as part of the total-
ity of the circumstances." Id. % 21. 
FN6. Although society's interest in pro-
moting officer safety is great, that interest 
must be weighed against society's interest 
in protecting individual liberty.... Balan-
cing these interests, courts have held that 
Page 8 
slight intrusions such as ordering a person 
out of a car or conducting background 
checks pursuant to a traffic stop are justifi-
able intrusions in order to allow officers to 
operate in safety. A Terry frisk is an intru-
sion of a greater magnitude. 
State v. Warren. 2003 UT 36, t 25, 78 
P.3d 590 (citations omitted) (discussing 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct 1868, 
20L.Ed.2d889(1968)). 
K 16 In State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, 78 P.3d 590, a 
police officer "testified that he did not have any 
reason to believe that [the defendant] was armed. 
He also testified that [the defendant] did not do 
anything that caused him any concern." Id. ^ 6. Yet 
the officer frisked the defendant for weapons. See 
id. The officer testified that he frisked the defend-
ant "to promote the safety of officers and others" 
and that he performed such frisks "as a matter of 
routine on anyone he orders out of a vehicle." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that such a frisk viol-
ated the Fourth Amendment. See id. ^ 33 ("[T]he 
officer's safety concerns in this case were not suffi-
cient to outweigh [the defendant's right to personal 
security."). Moreover, the court observed that "[i]n 
simple traffic stops where other indicia of danger-
ousness are absent, ordering the occupants of the 
vehicle out of the car clearly mitigates the inherent 
dangerousness of the stop." Id. f 27. 
^[17 Here, the State attempts to distinguish Wair en 
by pointing to the number of knives that officers re-
covered from the passengers, including Baker, at 
the outset. However, in this particular situation, the 
mere presence of the knives, which had been con-
fiscated at the time the officers decided to search 
the passengers, is not a "specific and articulable 
fact[ ] which, taken together with the rational infer-
ences from [that] fact[ ], would lead a reasonable 
person to conclude that the suspect may be armed 
and presently dangerous." See id. ^ 29 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
f 18 Looking at the totality of the circumstances, 
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nothing other than the knives gave police officers 
any reason to take precautionary steps. Even the 
most potentially threatening aspect of the stop-the 
many knives-demonstrates the lack of an objective 
danger. According to Officer Bartell's testimony, 
the knives were volunteered to him while the pas-
sengers were waiting to be on their way. Tellingly, 
the Terry frisk was not conducted until well after 
the officers collected the knives and only after the 
K-9 unit indicated the presence of drugs in the 
backseat of the vehicle. Perhaps this is why Officer 
Robertson admitted that "the reason that [the of-
ficers] decided to search ... Baker was not because 
[the officers] were afraid for [their] safety." In fact, 
all three officers testified as to having no 
heightened fear for their safety. *941 Rather, as 
Officer Robertson admitted, u[t]he reason [the of-
ficers] did [the Teny frisk] was to search for drugs 
and contraband." Thus, we determine that the 
factors supporting the reasonableness of the frisk 
are insufficient and that the frisk violated Baker's 
constitutional rights. 
CONCLUSION 
K 19 We hold that Baker was unlawfully detained 
from the moment the driver was placed under ar-
rest. Similarly, we hold that the mere presence of 
the already-confiscated knives did not tip the scales 
in favor of an objectively reasonable concern for 
officer safety. We reverse and remand. 
\ 20 I CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME, 
Judge.THORNE, Judge (concurring): 
U 21 I do not disagree with the majority opinion's 
determination that Baker was unlawfully frisked 
and that the contraband discovered on his person 
should be suppressed. I write separately, however, 
to clarify that I view the frisk as illegal solely be-
cause the length and scope of Baker's detention pri-
or to the frisk was unreasonable under the circum-
stances. Accordingly, I would simply disallow the 
frisk as a fruit of an unlawful detention without ad-
dressing whether it might be justified as a Teny 
frisk for weapons. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 
© 2008 Thomson ReutersAVest. 
US. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
\ 22uThe constitutionality of a search and seizure is 
determined by answering two questions: '(1) Was 
the police officer's action justified at its inception? 
and (2) Was the resulting detention reasonably re-
lated in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first place?' "Layton City v. 
Oliver, 2006 UT App 244, % 14, 139 P.3d 281 
(quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 
(Utah 1994)). Until recently, there was some ques-
tion about whether and when a private vehicle's 
passengers are deemed detained during an ordinary 
traffic stop. Last year, the Supreme Court answered 
that question in Brendlin v. California, — U.S. — , 
127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007), holding 
that a passenger in a private vehicle that is pulled 
over by police is "seized from the moment [the] car 
[comes] to a halt on the side of the road,"*rf. at 
2410, and suggesting that the seizure continues un-
til police indicate that the passenger is free to go, 
see id. at 2406-07 ("[A]ny reasonable passenger 
would have understood ... that no one in the car was 
free to depart without police permission.").™1 
FN1. In this case, not only did the police 
officers not inform Baker that he was free 
to go, they took at least one knife from him 
and retained it over the course of the stop. 
Police retention of personal property alone 
may be sufficient to establish a seizure un-
der our existing case law. See, eg., Salt 
Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, ffi[ 
14-17, 998 P.2d 274 (explaining that, gen-
erally, a person is seized while the police 
hold their identification papers or other 
property). Accordingly, the police actions 
in this case provide an independent basis 
for concluding that Baker was seized for 
the duration of the stop. 
% 23 Returning to the two-part analysis described in 
Lavton City v. Oliver, 2006 UT App 244, ^ 14, 139 
P.3d 281, I believe that it is implicit in the Brendlin 
opinion that this seizure of a vehicle's passengers is 
justified at its inception so long as the vehicle stop 
Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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itself is justified. See generally Brendlin, — U.S. -
—, 127 S.Ct. 2400. In the present case, the vehicle 
stop was supported by probable cause of a traffic 
violation and was clearly valid. Accordingly, I 
would deem Baker's seizure justified at its incep-
tion. 
K 24 The question then turns to whether Baker's 
continued detention was " 'reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances that justified the inter-
ference in the first place.' "Layton City, 2006 UT 
App 244, % 14, 139 P.3d 281 (citation omitted). In 
the context of a passenger detained solely as a res-
ult of a driver's traffic violation, this is not neces-
sarily a simple question to answer. At one extreme, 
it could be said that the passenger's continued de-
tention is not related in any way to the driver's 
traffic violation, and thus, the passenger's detention 
becomes illegal unless the officer informs the pas-
senger, at the officer's earliest convenience, that the 
passenger is free to go. The other extreme is argued 
by the State in this case: that a passenger is legitim-
ately detained so long as the driver is legitimately 
detained, however *942 long that might be. I do not 
subscribe to either of these positions and instead 
conclude that the validity of the passenger's deten-
tion, like most search and seizure questions, must 
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis looking at the 
totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., State v. 
Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, K 51, 156 P.3d 771 
(examining " 'all of the circumstances surrounding 
the search or seizure and the nature of the search or 
seizure itself " (quoting United States v. Montova 
de Hernandez. 473 U.S. 531, 537, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 
87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985))); State v. Marquez, 2007 
UT App 170, f 11, 163 P.3d 687 ("[T]he reason-
ableness of any warrantless search must be determ-
ined on a case-by-case basis with the focus on the 
totality of the circumstances."). 
f 25 I agree with the majority opinion that, under 
the circumstances of this case, police detention of 
Baker was not justified once the decision to arrest 
the driver was made. At that point, a brief traffic 
stop had turned into an indefinite detention. There 
V . + + ^ . / A T , ~ U 1 „ ™ + 1 — . — / - ' - - I - / - - -x_x 
was no possibility that Baker would shortly be al-
lowed to continue on his way as the driver's passen-
ger because the driver was not going to be allowed 
to leave. This significant change in the nature of the 
stop created, in my opinion, some obligation on the 
part of the officers to address the passengers' situ-
ation as unwilling detainees, with the ultimate res-
ult of informing the passengers in a timely manner 
that they were free to go. 
K 26 I express no opinion on how the police might 
fulfill this obligation in any particular case, or how 
rapidly they must do so. I note that police officers 
must have significant latitude to do their jobs and 
that I would not ordinarily find constitutional viola-
tions to be created by a few seconds, or even a few 
minutes, of variation in police practice from one 
stop to the next. Others may disagree. See State v. 
Adams, 2007 UT App 117. % 19, 158 P.3d 1134 
(Orme, J., dissenting) ("If football is a game of 
inches, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can be a 
matter of seconds."), cert denied,l6S P.3d 1264 
(Utah 2007). In this case, however, the police took 
no actions aimed at releasing the passengers over 
the ten to fifteen minutes between the driver's arrest 
and the drug dog's alert. 
^ 27 It is also relevant that the facts of this case 
suggest that Baker and the other passengers were 
being detained solely to await the arrival of the 
drug-sniffing dog. There seems to be no reason for 
their detention besides a desire that the dog screen 
the vehicle and all of its occupants for illegal drugs. 
Absent some separate justification for detaining 
Baker and the other passengers, each passenger's 
detention must be justified by individualized suspi-
cion of the criminal behavior being investigated 
during the detention-in this case, possession of 
drugs.™2 I see no such individualized suspicion 
here. A passenger's mere presence in a vehicle driv-
en by one whose driver license has been suspended 
because of drugs does not equate to reasonable sus-
picion that the passenger is involved 'with drugs. 
Cf. State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 956 (Utah 
CtApp.1993) (stating that a convicted drug user's 
j • 1 t\ / >-rl /-w-i—\r\ *- * 
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presence in a home is "not properly part" of the 
probable cause analysis required to justify a search 
warrant for drugs in the home). The State points to 
no other grounds for reasonable suspicion that 
Baker had drugs, and his detention for the sole pur-
pose of being screened for drug possession was 
therefore impermissible. 
FN2. The drug sniff of the driver and his 
car was likely entirely proper. See Illinois 
v. Caballes. 543 U.S. 405, 406-08, 125 
S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) 
(upholding dog sniff of stopped vehicle so 
long as it does not extend otherwise legit-
imate stop). The driver had been taken into 
custody, and the delay pending the arrival 
of the drug dog did not extend his deten-
tion in any way. By contrast, if the passen-
gers would otherwise have been allowed to 
proceed on their way, then their compelled 
presence pending the dog's arrival did ex-
tend their detention and must be justified 
by individualized reasons for doing so. 
% 28 In sum, a passenger who silently submits to 
police authority by remaining in a lawfully stopped 
vehicle is seized, but permissibly so in my opinion. 
See generally Brendlin v. California, — U.S. — , 
127 S.Ct 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007). And, so 
long as the stop is likely to be resolved in a reason-
ably short period of time and the focus of the deten-
tion is solely on the driver, I see no per se unreas-
onableness in the passenger's secondary detention. 
Here, however, *943 the driver's detention had ef-
fectively become permanent, and the investigatory 
scope of the detention had widened to include 
Baker as a target. Without some reason to inde-
pendently suspect Baker of wrongdoing, this deten-
tion of Baker was unreasonable and represents a vi-
olation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 
% 29 I would end the analysis at this point and re-
verse the trial court's suppression ruling. I see no 
reason to additionally address whether Baker's frisk 
was justified for officer safety reasons. If such a 
frisk had been timely performed, I might very well 
accede to it on officer safety grounds. See State v. 
Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 13, 78 P.3d 590 ("[A]n of-
ficer may perform a protective frisk pursuant to a 
lawful stop when the officer reasonably believes a 
person is *armed and presently dangerous to the of-
ficer or others.' " (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968))). 
Various factors might support a reasonable belief 
that Baker and his companions presented an armed 
danger to the officers conducting the stop-they out-
numbered the police and were in possession of an 
unusually large array of knives, it was late at night, 
and at least the driver had some previous criminal 
involvement. 
% 30 Nevertheless, the frisk in this case was not 
timely performed, but rather occurred after a sub-
stantial period of unlawful detention resulting from 
an unjustified desire to await the arrival of the 
drug-detection dog. As such, I believe it must be 
suppressed as the poisonous fruit of that unlawful 
detention even if it might have been justified if per-
formed earlier in the stop. See State v. Worwood. 
2007 UT 47, % 50, 164 P.3d 397 (rejecting the "if 
we hadn't done it wrong, we would have done it 
right" defense of unconstitutional searches and 
seizures). For these reasons I concur in the result 
reached by the majority, but with the clarifications 
and reservations expressed herein. 
Utah App.,2008. 
State v. Baker 
182 P.3d 935, 601 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 2008 UT App 
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Addendum D 
Deseret News 
Lehi officer shot: Police kill woman who opened fire 
By Sara Xsraelsen-Hartley 
Deseret News 
Pu&'stod J'tho 24 s&OS 
LEHI — Lehi police officers and city officials are reeling from a shooting Monday morning that 
sent a veteran police captain to the hospital and brought back memories of the last officer they 
lost. 
Just before 9 a.m., police Capt. Harold Terry pulled over a female driver suspected of being 
impaired, after a gas-station clerk called 911 to report the woman had exhibited slurred speech 
and poor balance. 
After a short disagreement at the car window, the 34-year-old woman, who was still seated in 
the car, suddenly fired twice with a .38-caliber revolver, hitting Terry twice in the left side of the 
head, just above his ear. Terry was able to draw his gun and fire once into the car and back-up 
officers on scene fired five rounds at the woman, killing her. 
One bullet exited Terry's head and the other bullet and shrapnel were surgically removed late 
Monday morning at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, where he was reported to be resting 
in stable condition, surrounded by family and friends, said Lehi Police Sgt. Darren Paul. 
"This is a trying time for all of us. WeYe all very close," Paul said, as he stood in front of the 
police station that bears the name of the last officer they lost — Lt. Joseph Adams. Like Terry, 
Adams had also stopped a suspected impaired driver when he was killed in August 2001. 
The woman fatally shot Monday morning is from Washington state but was living in Provo and 
attending school in Utah County. 
Police have not released her name pending notification of her family. 
Officers cannot find any indication that the woman has a criminal record, nor do they believe 
she was the subject of a warrant. They will be conducting an autopsy and toxicology reports 
and searching her car to determine what may have caused her behavior, Paul said. 
A combined group of investigators and officials from the Utah County Attorney's Office will be 
reviewing the use of force by the Lehi officers. 
"Traffic stops are considered the most dangerous encounters officers face," Paul said. "There 
are so many unknowns." 
Terry had followed the proper protocol for the stop at 1000 E. Main, in front of a busy gas 
station, Paul said. 
"He's a veteran leader here," Paul said. "He's very well respected and professional in how he 
carries out his duties." 
Although police captains are often found in an office behind a desk, Terry was out on the road 
and responded when he heard the dispatch report. 
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"Knowing Capt. Terry, I'm not a bit surprised," Paul said. "He leads by example." 
Terry has been with Lehi for 16 years and was promoted in February to captain over the patrol 
division, Paul said. 
As well as leading by example, Terry also trained and taught officers. 
He had just finished teaching one term of law enforcement operations at Provo College, which 
focuses on the day-to-day life of a police officer, said Ken Peay, program administrator for the 
criminal justice degree at Provo College. 
"Harold was an excellent teacher," Peay said. "He was really, really good with his students. I 
think he exemplifies the best of the best," Peay said. 
Terry had taken the summer semester off but planned to come back in the fall, Peay said. 
"He loved it," Peay said. "He was really good at it, you could tell how much he enjoyed it 
because of his demeanor in the classroom.... He made the classes come to life with his 
experiences." 
Several students have called wanting to send messages or flowers to the family, Peay said. 
One of the experiences Terry shared with students included being involved in a shoot-out with a 
former police comrade, Art Henderson, who had chased his ex-wife and her boyfriend through a 
residential Lehi neighborhood, firing several shots at them in January 2006. 
Lehi officers took Henderson down with several shots to the leg, and he was arrested. 
Henderson was later charged with numerous felonies, including attempted aggravated murder, 
but his criminal case ended in April 2006 when he hanged himself in a cell at the Salt Lake 
Metro Jail. 
"It's hard to think that these men and women put their lives on the line," said Lehi Mayor 
Howard H. Johnson, who stopped by the station to share his love and support with the force. 
Johnson, too, mentioned Adams when he talked about Monday's shooting. The poignant 
memory of the fallen officer is something no one has forgotten. 
In the August 2001 shooting, Adams found a bag of cocaine in a car he had pulled over, told 
the driver he was under arrest and began to handcuff him. Somehow the driver got one hand 
free, grabbed a handgun from his belt and shot Adams. 
Although wounded in two places, Adams was able to return fire, hitting the man multiple times. 
With a handcuff dangling from one wrist, the shooter, Arturo Javier Scott Welch, got in his car 
and drove away, according to Utah County Sheriffs officials. He was captured by Salt Lake 
County Sheriffs deputies at a gas station in Draper. 
Welch, 23, pleaded guilty to aggravated murder the following year and was sentenced to life in 
prison without the possibility of parole. 
At the time of that shooting, Adams, a three-year member of the Lehi Police Department, was 
married and had an 8-month-old son. 
In the aftermath of Monday's shooting, the task now is to support and pray for Terry and his 
family, as well as the family in Washington that has lost a loved one, the mayor said. 
"Right now, we'll do the best we can, pray and hope the Lord sees fit to bless him extra," 
Johnson said. 
http://www.deseretnews.com/artic1e/rnntpnt/rnoKii^/i ^ ^ ^ 
He extolled the police officers, saying that many people don't pick professions with inherent 
risks or obstacles. 
"But these good (officers) take a job that has them all," he said. "And they do it with a sense of 
cheer and happiness. We live in debt to them every day." 
E-mail: sisraelsen@desnews.com 
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Her family thought meds had aifrnent under control 
Woman killed after shooting Lehi cop had history of mental 
illness 
By Melinda Rogers and Nate Carlisle 
The Salt Lake Tribune 
Salt Lake Tribune 
Article Last Updated:06/24/2008 01:31:56 PM MDT 
The family of Kelly Wark says the 34-year-old had been struggling with mental illness for several months before 
she opened fire on a Lehi police captain during a traffic stop Monday and was killed by return fire. 
"She had struggled with severe mental illness in the past year and was on her way to beginning a new life," 
Warkfs parents, Robert and Mary Wark of Gig Harbor, Wash., wrote in a statement released today. "We offer our 
deepest condolences to the family of the officer that was hurt." 
Gwyn Vukich, a cousin of the Wark family who is serving as the Wark family's spokesperson, would not 
elaborate on specifics of Kelly Warkfs mental illness. But she said her cousin was on medication, and that her 
death came as a shock for family who believed she had her illness under control. 
Wark had moved to Utah to attend massage therapy school and excelled at art, Vukich said. She specialized in 
portraits and had earned degrees in art and psychology from Western Washington University in Bellingham 
before she decided she wanted to become a massage therapist, Vukich said. 
Her parents called Wark a "gentle, kind and loving person" in the statement. 
Police say Wark shot Capt. Harold Terry twice in the head after he pulled her over in response to reports of a 
woman who might be driving under the influence. Terry was hospitalized in serious condition this afternoon but 
is expected to make a full recovery, police said. 
Sometime before 8:45 a.m., Wark arrived at a gas station on the corner of 850 East and Main Street, according 
to police. The woman told the attendant she wanted to buy gas, said David Mayson, the station's manager, but 
then changed her mind as the attendant was in the midst of scanning her debit card. All the while she acted 
"distracted," Mayson said. 
Video footage from the gas station shows Wark walking to her tan Honda Accord and standing there "staring 
off into space," Mayson said. She drove away after a minute or so and the attendant called police to report the 
woman might be driving under the influence. 
Terry, a 55-year-old who has worked for Lehi police for 16 years, heard the call over his radio and responded. 
Sgt. Darren Paul said dispatcher records show Terry reported stopping the Accord at 8:52 a.m. near 1000 E. Main 
Street. Paul said Terry read the Washington state license plate number on the Accord to dispatchers before 
approaching the car. 
Other Lehi officers who arrived to assist Terry with the stop saw him speak with Wark inside the car. She was 
still seated in her car when the assisting officers saw and heard her fire two shots from a .38-caliber revolver, 
Paul said. 
Both bullets struck Terry on the left side of the head, with at least one bullet striking above the ear and exiting 
behind the ear, Paul said. Wark exited the car as the officers drew their weapons and ran toward her and Terry. 
Two officers fired on Wark, Paul said. Terry also fired one shot but it struck the car, Paul said. Wark, dressed 
in cargo pants and a dark shirt, died at the scene. 
Terry communicated with medical personnel at the scene and later at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center. 
Paul said Terry underwent at least one surgery Monday that removed bullet fragments. 
"We are optimistic and hopeful for a full recovery," Paul said. 
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Along with having plenty of his own experience, Terry trained other officers from Lehi and around the state in 
how to make traffic stops. The protocol includes specific ways to park behind the suspect's vehicle and how to 
walk upon and interact with the driver. Paul said it appears all those protocols were followed Monday. 
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